Around the Fed: Lending standards and the foreclosure crisis by Daniel Brooks
“Decomposing the Foreclosure Crisis: House Price
Depreciation versus Bad Underwriting.” Kristopher Gerardi,
Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul S. Willen, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2009-25, September 2009.
T
here are two competing theories to explain the sudden
outbreak of foreclosures from 2007 to 2009. One 
theory centers on poor underwriting standards: Borrowers
had trouble making payments on their mortgages because
those loans were either unrealistically generous or because
borrowers were taking out loans based on little income and
bad credit. An alternative explanation suggests that housing
values were the main explanatory variable in the growth of
foreclosures. After all, the authors point out, subprime
mortgage performed well until 2006 when house prices
began falling.  
Using deeds records from Massachusetts — including
residential mortgages, purchase and sale, and foreclosure
transaction between 1989 and 2008 — the authors create a
model to describe the explosion of foreclosures in
Massachusetts since 2005. To isolate the effects of the
underwriting standards, they estimated what the foreclosure
rate of subprime borrowers in 2005 would have been if the
price of the homes purchased were in line with the 2002
pricing levels. They discovered that the foreclosure rate
would have been vastly lower relative to the actual observed
foreclosure rate despite the larger percentage of subprime
borrowers that existed in 2005.   
The authors conclude that “relaxed underwriting stan-
dards did severely aggravate the crisis by creating a class of
homeowners who were particularly vulnerable to the decline
in prices.” Yet, “that emergence alone, in the absence of a
price collapse, would not have resulted in the substantial
foreclosure boom that was experienced.”
“Vacancy Posting, Job Separation, and Unemployment
Fluctuations.” Regis Barnichon, Federal Reserve Board
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-35, July
2009. 
I
n this paper, Barnichon asks the question, “At the begin-
ning of a recession, does unemployment go up because of
few hirings, more job losses, or both?” To provide an answer,
he suggests determining the relative importance of the two
main forces that drive unemployment — vacancy posting
(more job losses) and job separation (fewer hirings) — in
explaining the movement in the unemployment data.
He finds that, on average, vacancy postings drive unem-
ployment during normal times. But if you look at the turning
points of the business cycle, as Barnichon describes, job 
separation drives “rare but violent fluctuations in unemploy-
ment.” It’s responsible for almost all of the movements in
unemployment during the first two quarters after unemploy-
ment reaches a low or high point. (Vacancy postings don’t
become the main contributor until a year later.) The author
also concludes that previous studies which found the oppo-
site could lead economists to “understate the breadth and
speed of adjustment of unemployment around turning
points.”
“Why do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses.”
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2009-02,
July 2009.
I
n this paper, the authors address two important ques-
tions with respect to savings and the elderly: Why do
the elderly keep large amounts of assets until late in life?
And why do the wealthy elderly spend their assets more
slowly than the poor elderly?
In the paper, the authors describe their model of saving
by retired elderly singles. To develop their model, they use
data obtained from the Assets and the Health Dynamics of
the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey conducted by the
University of Michigan. Based on this dataset, they 
estimate the different processes for mortality and out-of-
pocket expenses as dependent on sex, health, permanent
income, and age. The authors also take into account social
insurance programs such as Medicaid, which was not
included in the AHEAD data. 
Their analysis shows that out-of-pocket medical
expenses grow at an increasing rate with both age and 
permanent income. This leads the authors to conclude
that for many elderly people the risk of having to pay
expensive medical bills as a result of living longer is a more
important motivation to save than the desire to leave
assets to loved ones in a will — the “bequest motivation,”
as economists call it. Indeed, the wealthy elderly in the
sample tend to live longer and have higher medical bills
than those below them on the income ladder. 
The poor are faced with a different scenario. Because
social insurance programs help protect against catas-
trophic medical expenses, the poor tend to consume
rather than save, leaving little money behind for retire-
ment. Such programs can also benefit the wealthy elderly
as well because these programs can protect them against
catastrophic medical expenses, which could have the
potential to bankrupt them.  RF
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